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1. Capitalistic Acts Between Consenting Adults 
 
Alex is looking for work. He’s young and doesn’t have any special skills, but is willing to put in the 
time to acquire them on the job. Bernice runs a restaurant. She could use an extra hand in the 
kitchen. The extra hand would be worth a little more than $9/hour for her bottom line. With the 
additional help, she could offer a couple more menu items and keep the place a bit cleaner, and she 
expects the additional customers that this would draw in to add up to just above $9/hour over the 
near future. The rate is good enough for Alex, and it sure beats getting paid nothing at all while 
idling his day away in his parents’ basement. Alex and Bernice would thus like to make an 
arrangement wherein Alex works at the restaurant for $9/hour. 
 
But suppose the government comes in and forbids this transaction. It says the wage is too low. The 
minimum wage an employer must pay to hire someone is $15/hour, according to this government’s 
policy. For Bernice, this is just not worth it. She’d rather not offer those new menu items and make 
the place that little bit cleaner. If she hires someone at the $15/hour rate to do the things she wants 
Alex to do, she’d be losing money. She’s not a charity, and besides, she has kids to feed. So, what 
ends up happening is that Bernice doesn’t hire Alex. 
 
Libertarians will take issue with this restriction for two main reasons. First, Alex has a right to do 
with his person as he wishes, so long as he’s not violating other people’s rights. He’s not violating 
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anyone’s rights by choosing to work at Bernice’s restaurant. Likewise, Bernice owns her restaurant 
and her liquid cash. She has a right to do with them as she pleases, so long as she’s not violating 
someone else’s rights. Obviously, she can’t use that cash to hire a hitman to kill someone. Likewise, 
she can’t burn her restaurant down for fun, because that might lead to nearby buildings catching on 
fire. But hiring Alex is not like doing these things. Thus, by forbidding this consensual transaction, 
the government is violating the rights of both Alex and Beatrice. 
 
Second, there are gains to be made left on the table. Alex would be better off if he has a job, by his 
own lights. He may be able to develop useful experience in the food industry. He can also use the 
money to buy an old car. Bernice, likewise, would be able to make her restaurant run more smoothly 
for a reasonable price, by hiring Alex. And so, both parties could be made better off. The wage 
restriction, then, is Pareto inefficient, in economic terms. 
 
The first reason is a rights-based reason to remove wage restrictions. The second is a welfare-based 
reason. Libertarians will see both these reasons as applying to a wide range of cases where a mutually 
consensual interaction is forbidden by some authority. Similar arguments can apply to, for instance, 
price ceilings on sales of goods, rent controls, tariffs, zoning restrictions, and so on. All these are 
ways to unjustly prohibit “capitalistic acts between consenting adults” (Nozick, 1974, p. 163). 
 
This reasoning seems to transfer over nicely to the case of immigration restriction. Suppose now 
that Alex lives in Guyana while Bernice’s restaurant is located in the United States. In this case, 
instead of a minimum wage restriction, there is an immigration restriction. Bernice would like to hire 
Alex, and Alex would like to work for Bernice, but the U.S. government says that he can’t move into 
and settle within its territory because he doesn’t fulfill any of the conditions required for obtaining 
residency (e.g. having immediate family in the U.S., having special skills, having won the green-card 
lottery, etc.). 
 
Here, libertarians will typically argue that Alex’s rights to free movement are being violated (Freiman 
and Hidalgo, 2016; van der Vossen and Brennan, 2018). Freedom of movement is a basic and 
important liberal right, on this view. Imagine that a government prohibited people’s movement from 
rural areas to cities, as was the case in many 20th century communist regimes. Such a society would 
not be upholding the basic principles of liberalism. Liberalism posits a fundamental right to free 
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movement. So, the U.S. does not live up to the principles of liberalism insofar as it prohibits Alex 
from moving into its territory. 
 
Bernice’s rights are being violated too, on the libertarian view (Carens, 1987). Bernice has a property 
right over her restaurant, and this means she can invite over whomever she wishes to enter it. If the 
government prohibited all customers from entering her restaurant, say, it would be violating her 
property rights. Likewise, the U.S. government violates Bernice’s property rights by decreeing that 
she can’t have Alex helping her at the restaurant. 
 
There is a powerful welfare-based argument here too. There are (big) potential gains left on the 
table. Alex would be made better off because he can earn a much higher wage in the U.S. than he 
can in Guyana. Besides, we’re stipulating that he wants to move to the U.S. and so by his own lights 
he is being made better off. Bernice can be made better off too. She will be able to hire him for a 
lower wage than she can hire a comparably skilled current U.S. resident. And thus, she stands to gain 
by hiring Alex. Having open borders, whereby people can move and settle as they please across 
national boundaries, then, promotes economic efficiency in the sense that it avoids situations where 
both parties within a particular context can be made better off. 
 
The welfare-based reason interacts with the rights-based reason. Some ways of interfering with a 
person’s opportunities to improve their welfare constitute impermissible harm. Thus, suppose a 
hungry individual seeks to go to a marketplace to buy a loaf of bread. However, an armed guard 
stops this individual at the gate of the market. Plausibly, this armed guard impermissibly harms the 
person who seeks to enter. It’s not simply that the guard fails to confer benefits on the hungry 
bread-seeker. Allowing this person to enter the market is not merely a nice, good-Samaritan thing to 
do; it’s the only minimally decent thing to do. Analogously, immigration restrictions constitute 
impermissible harms inflicted upon would-be immigrants, not merely permissible refusals to confer 
supererogatory benefits (Huemer, 2010). 
 
Thus, it looks like the case for open borders should be just as uncontroversial as the case against 
minimum wages, from the libertarian perspective. If people have a pro tanto right to free movement, 
and furthermore, overall welfare could be increased substantially by allowing for such movement, 
then there had better be very good countervailing reasons in favor of the status quo of restrictive 
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immigration policy (Kukathas, 2005). It seems hard to imagine how this justificatory burden could 
be met.  
 
In what follows, I will examine some potential avenues through which advocates for some 
immigration restriction have tried to meet the justificatory burden. Section 2 explores the 
implications of the popular idea that countries have special obligations to their own citizens. In 
Section 3, I turn to the question of culture, and whether and how reasons to preserve culture might 
justify immigration restriction. Section 4 takes up an influential strand of argument that builds on the 
idea that people have a right to free association, and that on the level of countries, this entails the 
right to exclude foreigners. Section 5 looks at the potential downstream effects of open borders, 
through the channel of economic inequality. Finally, Section 6 explores the new economics of 
immigration, which considers the potential effects of different kinds of immigration on the host 
country’s institutional quality.  
 
While libertarians have developed compelling responses to some of these points, others remain open 
questions. In particular, once we look at the issue from a non-ideal theory perspective, it’s no longer 
obvious that welfare and other important goods are maximized in the long run through a regime of 
open borders. Furthermore, libertarians who defend open borders owing to rights-based reasons will 
need to argue that the right to free movement across national borders is so strong that it outweighs 
the potential risks and externalities discussed in Sections 3, 5, and 6. 
 
 
2. The Interests of Citizens 
 
An immediate initial worry about fully open borders is the following. It’s one thing to allow one 
person, Alex, to move to the U.S. to work for Bernice. But open borders would mean anybody can 
move to the U.S. And the world contains a lot of people. The U.S. is an exceptionally rich country, 
and so many people will want to move to it in search of better jobs and opportunities. Yet, if 
enough people move, then the supply for labor (especially unskilled labor) will increase quite a bit. 
However, that will drive wages down, and harm domestic workers (Borjas, 2003). That is an 
unacceptable consequence, it might be thought. 
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Libertarians can give a compelling response here. First, potential wage depression for local workers 
does not generate a permission to restrict free movement. Take the domestic analogue. Suppose that 
people want to move from California to Texas in search of better living standards. This will mean 
some possible wage depression for Texan workers, as well as rent increases. Nonetheless, the Texas 
state government would be violating Californians’ rights if it forbade them to move to Texas for this 
reason. The same reasoning, libertarians will insist, applies across national borders. At any rate, it will 
be the burden of the immigration restrictionist to say why the cases are not analogous. 
 
One natural counterargument here is that a country’s government has special obligations towards its 
own citizens (Nagel, 2005; Sangiovanni, 2007). Even if one rejects the strongest versions of statism, 
according to which a country’s government only has obligations to its own citizens (Pevnick, 2011), it 
might nonetheless be thought that the state ought to be partial to its citizens’ interests. At any rate, 
this is implicit in many countries’ practices from welfare spending on domestic as opposed to 
international projects, defense strategies, diplomatic relations, trade deals, and so on. And so if free 
movement will depress wages for domestic workers, typically those lacking special skills – who will 
already be among the worst off in society – then, immigration restrictions of certain kinds might be 
required by justice (Macedo, 2007, 2011). 
 
Here, libertarians can deny that governments have special obligations to their citizens that can justify 
the rights-violations of foreigners (Huemer, 2010). After all, if conquering and colonizing Canada 
would make current U.S. citizens better off, it still doesn’t mean this is a permissible thing to do. 
Why? Because conquering and colonizing Canada would violate the sovereignty rights of Canadians. 
So, even if you can give preferential treatment to your own citizens in some ways – by giving them 
welfare checks, medical aid, defense protection, etc. – you can’t do so in a way that violates the 
rights of non-citizens. But, libertarians will note, restricting immigration violates the free movement 
rights of foreigners. 
 
Now, some might simply deny that there is a right to free movement across national borders. 
Moreover, liberal societies restrict freedom of movement within their borders in many ways that 
don’t seem problematic (Miller, 2005; Wellman, 2008; Joshi, 2020). For example, you cannot enter 
others’ property without their permission. Similarly, you cannot go into the gate areas of airports 
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without a boarding pass. So, the burden may well be on the libertarian to show why such restrictions 
are okay but the requirement to meet certain conditions in order to settle within a country is not. 
 
Libertarians can sidestep this issue to the extent that they can show that open borders are in fact 
beneficial to current citizens. One thing to stress is that just as the supply of labor would increase 
due to open migration, so would the demand for it (Caplan and Weinersmith, 2019). The new 
immigrants would also consume goods and services, for the production of which more workers 
would be needed. Furthermore, even supposing that the wages of some citizens would inevitably be 
depressed – particularly of those with low skill levels – the economic surplus created by open 
borders could be partly used to compensate them, with ample left over. Thus, even if open borders 
may not be Pareto superior, they could be Kaldor-Hicks superior.1 
 
Some economists have argued that there would be a very large surplus indeed due to open migration 
– with estimates ranging from 50 to 150 percent world GDP (Clemens, 2011). This supports the 
utilitarian case for open borders. Libertarians and others who hold their policy views on utilitarian 
grounds will thus find this reason particularly compelling. Furthermore, the extent of the surplus 
also bolsters the case for the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency of open borders, and if governments do 
actually implement plans to compensate their adversely affected citizens, then even a nationalist who 
believes that the interests of the domestic needy are especially weighty can embrace open borders. 
 
Finally, one concern that often crops up, particularly in popular discussions of immigration, is the 
potential increase in crime associated with immigration from particular sources. A regime of (more) 
open borders, the thought goes, would increase the prevalence of crime within the host country, 
thereby generating a good reason for that country to resist such a policy. Defenders of open borders 
have noted that within the United States in particular, the crime rates of natives actually exceed 
those of the foreign-born population (Ewing, Martinez and Rumbaut, 2015). So, the argument 
seems to rely on faulty empirical premises, at least in the case of the U.S. However, this is not true 
across the world, for example Sweden (Martens, 1997). At any rate, it is interesting to think about 
the ethics of immigration within a context where the average immigrant from Country A to Country 
                                                        
1 A distribution D1 is Pareto inefficient if at least one person could be made better off without anybody being made worse 
off. A distribution D2 is Pareto superior to D1 just in case at least one person is better off in D2 and nobody is worse off. A 
distribution D3 is Kaldor-Hicks superior to D1 if goods within D3 could be redistributed so as to generate D2 and D2 is 
Pareto superior to D1. Importantly, D3 itself need not be Pareto superior to D1 (Gaus, 2008). 
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B is in fact more likely to engage in criminal activity than the native resident of B. Again, one’s 
conclusion will depend on how strong one thinks of a state’s obligations to its own citizens as being, 
as well as how much weight one puts on the right to free movement.  
 
Libertarians here will hasten to emphasize that even within countries there are differences among the 
crime rates of different regions. And yet, within liberal democracies at least, we do not forbid the 
movement of people across regions where crime rates differ – this would be considered an 
inappropriate violation of liberty (Jaworski, 2020). Furthermore, blanket prohibitions of movement 
would seem to punish the many for the actions of a few, which grates against most plausible 
conceptions of justice. In general, we don’t punish all people with red hair for the actions of one 
person with red hair (Caplan and Weinersmith, 2019) – so why should we punish all potential 
immigrants from Country A for the actions of a small minority of immigrants from Country A? 
 
 
3. The Question of Culture 
 
A separate, not primarily economic, concern with open borders is that it would undermine the 
preservation of culture (De Clercq, 2017). Large enough in-migrations of individuals from different 
cultures would inevitably alter the overall culture and character of a place, the thought goes, and 
people have a right to determine the shape of their future public culture (Miller, 2005, 2016). Thus, 
imagine a large movement of people from south and southeast Asia into Japan, which has a 
relatively high standard of living. It’s natural to think that the public culture of modern-day Japan, 
including language, customs of various kinds, cultural products, etc. would change over time so as to 
alter the character of the place. If the Japanese have a right to determine the future trajectory of their 
culture, then they have a right to exclude foreigners as they deem fit. 
 
There are two main responses libertarians have given here. One is that culture is constantly in flux. 
Cultures are not fixed points, nor is it desirable for them to be. Furthermore, immigration might 
enrich and complement an existing culture, rather than degrade it (Caplan and Weinersmith, 2019). 
Second, cultural preservation is not a sufficient justification to override the rights of individuals 
(Freiman and Hidalgo, 2016). To see this, we might note that the goal of cultural preservation can be 
threatened in many ways. For example, the consumption of foreign films by a country’s residents 
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might alter its future cultural trajectory. But it would be draconian and illiberal to ban foreign films 
for this reason. Similarly, people choosing to leave a particular religion to become atheists might 
change culture in the long run as well. But again, it would be illiberal to achieve cultural preservation 
by banning apostasy. If freedom of movement is a basic right like freedom of conscience, then, it 
may not be overridden by the goal of cultural preservation. 
 
The general force of the culture argument might depend in part on what is meant by ‘culture’. 
Insofar as the notion of culture in question largely consists in food, dress, methods of worship, etc., 
it’s hard to see how preserving the homogeneity of culture can justify interference with the free 
movement of foreigners. The cultural preservation argument is much more plausible, however, to 
the extent that we think of culture as comprising the basic norms, values, and levels of social trust 
present in a society. And these, some have argued, vary quite deeply and significantly across the 
world (Huntington, 1996, 2004; Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan, 2010). 
 
The problem becomes especially pressing once we consider the question of immigration from 
cultures where the dominant norms are illiberal. What should libertarians – or more broadly, those 
who accept basic liberal principles – say about open migration from countries where policies like the 
death penalty for apostasy, the stoning of adulterers, mandatory clothing restrictions for women, etc. 
enjoy popular support? The worry here is then that liberalism would be self-undermining. If cultural 
norms are sufficiently robust, and if sufficient numbers of individuals endorsing illiberal norms 
move to a country where the dominant culture is broadly liberal, that liberalism may not last for 
long. If the newcomers are given voting rights, then the issue becomes even more severe, for they 
might vote for politicians who support illiberal policies. Liberalism, then, would seem to be 
committed to welcoming its own eventual destruction (Joshi, 2018). 
 
Defenders of open borders have two chief options. One is to hold out hope that assimilation into 
the host country’s culture would occur such that individuals moving from places where the culture is 
illiberal to liberal democracies would come to accept liberal norms. Some might argue that the very 
desire to move to a liberal democracy suggests that the individual in question accepts, or is likely to 
accept, norms in the liberal neighborhood. However, this may not be the case if the primary motives 
for immigration in a particular context are economic rather than cultural. At any rate, this is an 
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empirical question that is impossible to settle from the armchair and needs rigorous and 
dispassionate sociological analysis. 
 
The second option is to bite the bullet and hold that even if liberalism is threatened by illiberal 
migration, the right to freedom of movement is strong enough to override this potential concern 
(Weltman, 2020). One can interpret the right to free movement in a Kantian way here. Kant thought 
that it is impermissible to lie even to a murderer who asks where the person whom he intends to kill 
has gone (Kant, 1996). Likewise, it might be thought, even if liberal norms in the host country are 
threatened by migration in large enough numbers from an illiberal culture, nonetheless it is simply 
wrong to infringe on individuals’ right to free movement. The challenge will be to spell out why the 
right to move and settle across all national borders, as opposed to rights to exit and free movement 
within particular countries, is sufficiently weighty in a way that doesn’t invite implausible policy 
conclusions in other domains. 
 
 
4. Freedom of Association 
 
An influential argument for countries’ rights to determine immigration policy is based on freedom of 
association (Wellman, 2008). Freedom of association is thought to be an important right within a 
liberal order. For example, we have a right to choose whom we marry. A practice of forced marriage 
would be violating the individual’s right to determine whom she associates with. Likewise, the ideal 
of freedom of association is foundational for religious freedom as well.  In a liberal order, we are 
free to choose our religious associates – hence, an individual cannot be forced to worship with 
others whom she doesn’t want to worship with. 
 
Wellman argues that just as individuals have the right to free association, so do groups and states. 
Thus, a golf club is within its rights to determine membership as it pleases. To make the golf club 
accept anyone who wishes to join would be to violate the rights of free association of individuals 
within it. Now, it might be thought that since association within states is non-voluntary – we are 
born within particular states, without having previously made a conscious decision to join the 
political community – that freedom of association cannot apply to states. But Wellman observes that 
it would be wrong to force say, Canada, to join a particular trade agreement. Likewise, it would be 
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wrong for the U.S. unilaterally annex Canada (even supposing this could be done without any 
violence – which is plausible given the comparative strengths of the militaries in question). Why 
would it be wrong to do these things? Wellman concludes that the wrong lies in violating the 
freedom of association of legitimate states. 
 
A libertarian might concede the state’s right to free association, but nevertheless point out that 
Bernice’s property rights in the case mentioned earlier are in tension with the state right. And, when 
the rights of individuals and states conflict, a libertarian will typically come down in favor of the 
former. However, Wellman contends that one cannot always resolve the tension in this way without 
committing oneself to anarchism. States must, and do, limit our property rights in many ways. Some 
decisions must inevitably be made by the political community as a whole in order for a state to 
function. 
 
The other worry has to do with Alex’s freedom of movement. Isn’t this obviously being curtailed by 
immigration restriction? Here, Wellman has two responses. First, the right to free movement is not 
absolute and unqualified – we need permission to enter others’ property for example. Second, and 
more important, the right to free movement, properly understood, does not entail a duty on behalf 
of states to invite prospective settlers into their territory. Analogously, the freedom to choose one’s 
spouse does not entail a duty on behalf of an individual to marry any and all suitors. Therefore, 
though Alex ought to have the freedom to exit Guyana, that freedom is only a freedom to enter a 
country willing to accept him – just as your freedom to marry is only a freedom to marry a person 
who is willing to marry you. 
 
Wellman’s argument has invited several replies and I will briefly mention a few strategies here. First, 
liberties, including the liberty to associate, plausibly come with a harm proviso. Thus, your right to 
property and free association does not entail a right to have loud parties at 3 A.M. But the exclusion 
of would-be immigrants harms their interests in many ways. When exclusion has this potential to 
harm, the presumptive liberty to freely associate starts to look weaker. Perhaps we do not fret so 
much about golf clubs because exclusion there does not involve the kinds of serious harms that the 
case of immigration restriction presents (Fine, 2010). Moreover, even in the domestic case, the 
“public accommodation” doctrine and laws against discrimination of various kinds, show that we 
limit freedom of association in important ways in order to secure other rights and goods. Another 
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worry is that it’s not obvious how a state’s right to exclude individuals from its territory can be 
grounded in a right to free association. A yoga club that meets regularly in Central Park might well 
be within its rights to exclude others from joining the club’s activities, but it may not unilaterally 
exclude others from the physical space in Central Park (Fine, 2010).  
 
A distinct objection results from revisiting the involuntary nature of state membership. Unlike clubs, 
we cannot choose not to be part of a state and neither can we easily form states of our own. These 
features of states threaten to undermine Wellman’s analogy with clubs. Clubs, because of their 
voluntary nature may require many things states cannot require. One could start a club exclusively 
for people who cut off their left arms, for example. Crazy club, but nobody is forced to join – take it 
or leave it. While it would not be a rights violation to start such a club, a state, on the other hand, if 
it required its residents to cut off their left arms, would obviously be acting impermissibly (Huemer, 
2010). 
 
According to yet another line of response, Wellman’s argument relies on an equivocation between 
whether the right to free association is understood on an individual or collective level (van der 
Vossen, 2015). If the proper locus of the right is meant to be the state as a collective entity, then 
would-be immigrants do not seek to associate with the state. On the other hand, it may be thought 
that immigrants seek to associate with all the individuals within a state, and it is that collection of 
individuals which reserves the right to free association. But now it becomes puzzling why smaller 
collections of individuals (Texans, say) may not similarly exclude compatriots (Californians, for 
example) from settling within the territory they occupy. 
 
 
5. Inequality and Non-Ideal Theory 
 
One critique of open borders proposals is that they would exacerbate domestic inequalities. Since 
the average immigrant under a regime of open borders is going to be less skilled than the average 
worker in developed countries (due to educational and other disparities), domestic inequality would 
spike – even if workers are to be paid their marginal products. There would be some haves and lots 
of (relative) have nots. What’s more, the shape of inequality might also take a “racialized” form, 
leading to undesirable social consequences in the long run (Salam, 2018). 
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This form of critique cuts little ice with libertarian thinkers, who typically do not see inequality as 
bad in and of itself. If a scheme benefits both parties, what’s there to lament? In general, the trade of 
goods and services leads to Pareto improvements even if it leads to greater inequality. Thus, suppose 
that A has 5 units of welfare and B has 4 under a regime where they cannot trade their goods. If they 
are allowed to trade, both can be made better off (if this were not so, they wouldn’t trade). Now 
suppose after the trade, A moves up to 10 and B gets up to 6. In this situation, there is more 
inequality. Some might think that the resulting increase in inequality is bad in and of itself, and 
morally outweighs the welfare gains made by both parties. But this sort of view seems perverse to 
many classical liberal and libertarian thinkers. 
 
Under a regime of open borders, then, in principle, nobody would have a reasonable complaint in 
relation to the status quo. This would be true especially if the domestic workers who experience 
wage losses are compensated with the economic surplus gained through labor mobility – either 
directly through cheaper goods or indirectly through some mechanism of redistributive taxation. A 
regime of open borders then, has the potential to lift all boats, and thus it is preferable to the status 
quo even if domestic inequality would thereby rise. 
 
Moreover, open borders would dramatically reduce global inequality, by allowing individuals to move 
from poor countries to richer ones in search of better opportunities (Caplan and Weinersmith, 
2019). Thus, we’d have a situation where domestic inequality rises but global inequality drops. Why 
prioritize the former over the latter? Imagine that allowing workers to move from rural areas to 
metropolitan areas increased their standard of living, and reduced inequality within the country as a 
whole. But suppose it were to increase inequality within big cities in particular. It would seem 
perverse to prohibit migration for this reason, especially if all parties were gaining from the 
movement. The same reasoning may be applied to the case of migration across national borders. 
 
However, one worry here arises from considering how the political dynamics might play out given 
the non-ideal world we live in. Libertarians often stress the indispensability of non-ideal theory in 
their critiques of both Rawlsian and socialist theories of justice (Brennan, 2014; Freiman, 2017). 
Brennan thus emphasizes the need to compare non-ideal socialist economies (e.g. the former USSR, 
Venezuela, Cuba) with non-ideal market economies (e.g. U.S., Japan, Denmark), rather than simply 
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idealizing away the moral limitations of human beings when considering socialist justice (Cohen, 
2009). Freiman argues that if humans were ideally motivated by justice (Rawls, 1971, 2001) then 
there would be no need for a redistributive state. The very need for such a state implies that people 
are not always motivated by justice. Thus, we should take the various incentives of voters, 
politicians, lobbyists, bureaucrats, etc. into account when assigning redistributive roles to the state. 
In general, the public choice tradition in economics and philosophy emphasizes looking at politics 
“without romance” (Brennan and Buchanan, 1985; Buchanan, 1999, 2001). 
 
But if we are to look at politics without romance in this way then we need to carefully think about 
what would actually happen if there were vast domestic inequalities. Empirical work suggests that 
inequality is correlated with instability and lack of investment (Alesina and Perotti, 1996). Within the 
United States, rising inequality has already led to strong and popular calls for restricting economic 
freedom in a variety of ways – for example through high minimum wages, national rent controls, 
steep redistributive taxes, and so on. It seems implausible to think that adding to this inequality 
would not push electoral dynamics even further in this direction – which, by libertarians’ own lights, 
would be counterproductive. Indeed, libertarians commonly point out that economic liberty is 
strongly correlated with high standards of living (Gwartney, Hall and Murphy, 2019; United Nations 
Development Programme, 2019). If open borders would lead to greater domestic inequality, which 
would in turn lead to greater instability and lower economic freedom, then it’s not obvious that the 
pros outweigh the cons, even if in an ideal world, they would. 
 
These worries are further exacerbated by two factors. First, studies of immigration to the developed 
world suggest there is strong intergenerational transmission of outcomes (Borjas, 1993, 2006; Park 
and Myers, 2010; Salam, 2018). The immigrants whose children do well in the economy were already 
relatively well off in their countries of origin before they moved. There is reason to suspect, then, 
that the inequality caused by a more open regime of migration may well be persistent.  
 
Second, given the scope of labor restrictions and welfare provisions, particularly in Western 
European countries like Sweden, many low-skill immigrants find themselves unemployed while 
being supported by the state (Frum, 2015; Salam, 2018). In such scenarios then, the argument that 
open borders would be beneficial to both the immigrants themselves as well as the receiving 
countries becomes implausible. The Nobel Prize winning libertarian economist Milton Friedman 
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thus argued that open borders are undesirable within the context of the welfare state, even if they 
would be desirable in a situation of no welfare provisions (Friedman, 1999). Of course, libertarians 
might argue here that the just thing to do is to get rid of the modern welfare state, but that is politics 
with a generous dose of romance. 
 
 
6. The New Economics of Immigration 
 
The classic economic case for open borders relies on the following reasoning. Countries vary greatly 
in terms of the quality of their institutions. Some have much more by way of rule of law and 
economic freedom than others. This in turn has implications for how productive individuals can be 
within different countries. Workers can be much more productive in places with relatively good 
institutions. So, one obvious way to dramatically boost world GDP is to allow for free movement 
between countries so that workers can go to those places where they’re most productive. Regardless 
of level of skill, a worker can be much more productive in the U.S. or Japan or Denmark as 
compared to Haiti or India or Nicaragua. Therefore, permitting free movement would dramatically 
increase world GDP – and thus living standards across the globe – by allowing labor to be allocated 
where it’s most productive (Clemens, 2011). 
 
An analogous case can be made for trade in factors of production in general. Imagine that there is a 
ban on the sale of iron from Region A to Region B. Suppose Region A uses iron for making cast 
iron pans, whereas Region B has a thriving steel industry. Now steel is much more of a needed good 
than cast iron pans. Steel is used for making buildings, highways, surgical instruments, and much 
else. If Region A were to open trade in iron, much of that iron would go towards making steel in 
Region B – which would be a vastly better use for that iron. Instead, that iron mostly sits in the 
mines of Region A and some goes to making very cheap cast iron pans. A regime of open trade here 
has the potential of making use of resources in the most productive and helpful ways to society in 
general. Similar points apply in the case where the “good” in question is labor. 
 
Does the analogy go through? One reason to resist the analogy is that while the movement of goods 
does not change institutions (except perhaps obliquely and indirectly), the movement of people might. 
James Buchanan, the founder of the public choice school in economics, put it thus: 
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The entry of an immigrant into an ongoing social-political-legal-economic order, with a 
defined membership, an experienced history, and a set of informal conventions, necessarily 
modifies the structure of “the game itself”… Membership involves more than a joining of 
the economic exchange network. Membership carries with it the power and authority, even if 
small, to modify the political-legal-constitutional parameters within which the economic 
game is played (Buchanan, 2007, p. 62). 
 
The idea here is that immigration has the potential to change institutions. It’s a mistake to simply 
assume that institutions are externally fixed – or “exogenous” – variables. Rather, institutions are 
endogenous to the question of immigration policy in the sense that their future shape depends on 
which immigration policy is adopted. 
 
The new economic debate then hinges on how immigration can change institutions. One idea is that 
moving the representative person from Country A to Country B in large enough numbers will make 
Country B’s institutions more like Country A’s in the long run (Collier, 2013; Borjas, 2015; Jones, 
2016). Some reasons to think this include the following. If you look at estimates of the quality of 
institutions in 1500 A.D. (as indicated by technological advancement, population density, etc.) and 
look at where people moved since then, it turns out that the countries with good institutions now 
have populations whose ancestors largely originated from countries with good institutions 500 years 
ago (Ang, 2013; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2013). This suggests that people take their institutions with 
them, in a sense. Another empirical result in favor of this view is that movement from countries 
with high corruption levels to countries with relatively low corruption levels increases the levels of 
corruption in the latter (Dimant, Krieger and Redlin, 2015). Given that many of the world’s poorest 
countries also have high corruption levels, and that people are most likely to move to the developed 
world from such countries, the worry is especially pressing. Third, trusting behavior, as well as the 
transmission of trust to new generations, depends strongly on the country of origin (Algan and 
Cahuc, 2010; Alesina and Giuliano, 2014). Since social trust, and informal institutions in general 
(Williamson, 2009), are important for long term economic growth and prosperity, it’s not obvious 
that open borders will promote economic prosperity within receiving countries in the long run. 
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Some libertarian defenders of open borders might argue that insofar as the mechanism by which 
new immigrants might change a country’s institutions in the long run is voting, then a compromise 
might be to avoid or delay the granting of voting rights (Caplan and Weinersmith, 2019). Essentially, 
what is being suggested is a system approximating modern day Qatar or the United Arab Emirates 
or Singapore, where large numbers of migrant workers are admitted but disenfranchised (Salam, 
2018). However, this is again a form of ideal theorizing. These three states, though they have 
economic institutions that allow for high standards of living, are nowhere near as democratically 
controlled as the United States or Sweden. Given the ways modern democracies actually function, it 
is hard to imagine them maintaining a large class of disenfranchised workers even if this were, for 
the sake of argument, a desirable outcome. 
 
Now, one might accept some of these worries, but nonetheless claim that the overall utilitarian 
calculus still comes down in favor of open borders. Even if the modern developed world might see 
the quality of its institutions deteriorate, the welfare gains made by those allowed to settle in new 
countries will outweigh the welfare losses caused by the relative drop in institutional quality in some 
places. What’s more, some countries may well experience an increase in institutional quality if they 
have to “compete” with other countries to keep residents. 
 
This, of course, is a complex case to evaluate. However, there are some important considerations for 
wanting some countries to have excellent institutions, as opposed to having one large global scheme 
with mediocre institutions. The main point to note here is that countries with relatively excellent 
economic institutions (like the United States, Denmark, Japan) have enormous positive externalities 
in terms of innovation and technology. Antibiotics, the light bulb, automotive vehicles, modern 
surgical techniques, vaccines, and much else have come almost exclusively from the developed world 
– modern day North America, Europe, and East Asia in particular. These developments have been a 
huge boost to humanity as a whole, dramatically improving life expectancy and standards of living 
around the world. Even on the purely utilitarian calculus then, it’s not obvious that a regime of open 
borders would be optimal in the long run (Joshi, 2020). 
 
The quality of institutions debate regarding open borders is by no means settled. According to some 
new work, recent data show that the total factor productivity (TFP) of host countries is largely 
unaffected by low TFP levels of origin countries of immigrants (Clemens and Pritchett, 2019). In 
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other words, economic institutions may be fairly robust, in modern contexts, to immigration shocks. 
Going forward, however, the economic case for open borders is bound to be complex, requiring 
further detailed analysis. For the reasons Buchanan suggested, the toy economic model on which 
open movement yields Pareto efficient outcomes is complicated by the simple fact that people are 
not like goods – the movement of people across borders has important potential downstream 
implications for the very nature of the economic and political “game” being played, in a way that the 





When it comes to the immigration debate, libertarians have typically come down in favor of open 
borders. In doing so, they have marshalled strong rights-based considerations – of property and free 
movement in particular – as well as welfare-based reasons having to do with mutual gains that are 
left on the table via immigration restriction. In general, libertarians have been skeptical that reasons 
of cultural preservation or putative special obligations to compatriots can bear the normative weight 
necessary to outweigh the defeasible case for open borders. 
 
Depending on the context, however, looser immigration restrictions might have institutional 
consequences in the long run of a kind that, by libertarians’ own lights, would be detrimental. 
Dramatic increases in domestic inequality, for example, might bolster demands for further 
redistributive measures and government limitations on market transactions. The future contours of 
the debate will have to take these “public choice” considerations seriously. This is true especially 
since close attention to the non-ideal workings of institutions has long been a core argumentative 






Alesina, A. and Giuliano, P. (2014) ‘Family Ties’, in Aghion, P. and Durlauf, S. (eds) Handbook of 
Economic Growth. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Alesina, A. and Perotti, R. (1996) ‘Income distribution, political instability, and investment’, European 
Economic Review, 40(6), pp. 1203–1228. 
Algan, Y. and Cahuc, P. (2010) ‘Inherited Trust and Growth’, American Economic Review, 100(5), pp. 
2060–2092. 
Ang, J. (2013) ‘Institutions and the long-run impact of early development’, Journal of Development 
Economics, 105, pp. 1–18. 
Borjas, G. J. (1993) ‘The Intergenerational Mobility of Immigrants’, Journal of Labor Economics, 11(1), 
pp. 113–135. 
Borjas, G. J. (2003) ‘The Labor Demand Curve is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of 
Immigration on the Labor Market’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4), pp. 1335–74. 
Borjas, G. J. (2006) ‘Making It in America: Social Mobility in the Immigrant Population’, The Future 
of Children, 16(2), pp. 55–71. 
Borjas, G. J. (2015) ‘Immigration and Globalization: A Review Essay’, Journal of Economic Literature, 
53(4), pp. 961–974. doi: 10.1257/jel.53.4.961. 
Brennan, G. and Buchanan, J. M. (1985) The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Brennan, J. (2014) Why Not Capitalism? New York: Routledge. 
Buchanan, J. M. (1999) The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. 
Buchanan, J. M. (2001) Moral Science and Moral Order. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. 
Buchanan, J. M. (2007) ‘A Two Country Parable’, in Schwartz, W. F. (ed.) Justice in Immigration. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Caplan, B. and Weinersmith, Z. (2019) Open Borders: The Science and Ethics of Immigration. New York: 
First Second. 
Carens, J. H. (1987) ‘Aliens and Citizens’, Review of Politics, 49(2), pp. 251–273. 
Clemens, M. A. (2011) ‘Economics and Emigration: Trillion-Dollar Bills on the Sidewalk?’, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 25(3), pp. 83–106. 
 19 
Clemens, M. and Pritchett, L. (2019) ‘The new economic case for migration restrictions: An 
assessment’, Journal of Development Economics, 138, pp. 153–164. 
Cohen, G. A. (2009) Why Not Socialism? Princeton University Press. 
Collier, P. (2013) Exodus: How Migration is Changing Our World. New York: Oxford University Press. 
De Clercq, R. (2017) ‘Huemer on Immigration and the Preservation of Culture’, Philosophia, 45, pp. 
1091–1098. doi: 10.1007/s11406-017-9830-3. 
Dimant, E., Krieger, T. and Redlin, M. (2015) ‘A Crook is a Crook … But is He Still a Crook 
Abroad? On the Effect of Immigration on Destination-Country Corruption’, German Economic 
Review, 16(4), pp. 464–489. 
Ewing, W. A., Martinez, D. and Rumbaut, R. G. (2015) The Criminalization of Immigration in the United 
States. Washington D.C.: American Immigration Council. Available at: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2631704. 
Fine, S. (2010) ‘Freedom of Association Is Not the Answer’, Ethics, 120(2), pp. 338–356. 
Freiman, C. (2017) Unequivocal Justice. New York: Routledge. 
Freiman, C. and Hidalgo, J. (2016) ‘Liberalism or Immigration Restrictions, but Not Both’, Journal of 
Ethics and Social Philosophy, 10(2), pp. 1–23. doi: 10.26556/jesp.v10i2.99. 
Friedman, M. (1999) ‘Q&A with Milton Friedman’, ISIL Interview. 
Frum, D. (2015) ‘America’s Immigration Challenge’, The Atlantic, 11 December. Available at: 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/refugees/419976/ (Accessed: 16 August 
2020). 
Gaus, G. (2008) On Philosophy, Politics, and Economics. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
Gwartney, J., Hall, J. and Murphy, R. (2019) Economic Freedom of the World: 2019 Annual Report. Fraser 
Institute. Available at: https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/economic-freedom-of-
the-world-2019.pdf (Accessed: 16 August 2020). 
Henrich, J., Heine, S. and Norenzayan, A. (2010) ‘The weirdest people in the world?’, Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences, 33(2–3), pp. 61–83. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X0999152X. 
Huemer, M. (2010) ‘Is There a Right to Immigrate?’, Social Theory and Practice, 36(3), pp. 429–461. 
Huntington, S. (1996) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & 
Schuster. 
Huntington, S. (2004) Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity. New York: Simon & 
Schuster. 
 20 
Jaworski, P. (2020) ‘Markets Without Labor Limits: Crime, Welfare, Jobs, and Culture’, in Fischer, B. 
(ed.) Ethics Left and Right. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Jones, G. (2016) ‘Do Immigrants Import Their Economic Destiny?’, Evonomics, 17 September. 
Available at: http://evonomics.com/do-immigrants-import-their-economic-destiny-garrett-jones/ 
(Accessed: 16 August 2020). 
Joshi, H. (2018) ‘Is Liberalism Committed to Its Own Demise?’, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 
13(3), pp. 259–267. doi: 10.26556/jesp.v13i3.367. 
Joshi, H. (2020) ‘For (Some) Immigration Restrictions’, in Fischer, B. (ed.) Ethics: Left and Right. New 
York: Oxford University Press, pp. 191–199. 
Kant, I. (1996) Practical Philosophy. Edited by M. J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kukathas, C. (2005) ‘The Case for Open Immigration’, in Cohen, A. I. and Wellman, C. H. (eds) 
Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 207–220. 
Macedo, S. (2007) ‘The Moral Dilemma of U.S. Immigration Policy’, in Swain, C. (ed.) Debating 
Immigration. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 63–82. 
Macedo, S. (2011) ‘When and Why Should Liberal Democracies Restrict Immigration?’, in Smith, R. 
M. (ed.) Citizenship, Borders, and Human Needs. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 
301–323. 
Martens, P. L. (1997) ‘Immigrants, Crime, and Criminal Justice in Sweden’, Crime and Justice, 21. 
Miller, D. (2005) ‘Immigration: The Case for Limits’, in Cohen, A. I. and Wellman, C. H. (eds) 
Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics. Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
Miller, D. (2016) Strangers in Our Midst. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Nagel, T. (2005) ‘The Problem of Global Justice’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 33(2), pp. 113–147. doi: 
10.1111/j.1088-4963.2005.00027.x. 
Nozick, R. (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia. New York: Basic Books. 
Park, J. and Myers, D. (2010) ‘Intergenerational mobility in the post-1965 immigration era: Estimates 
by an immigrant generation cohort method’, Demography, 47, pp. 369–392. 
Pevnick, R. (2011) Immigration and the Constraints of Justice: Between Open Borders and Absolute Sovereignty. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Rawls, J. (2001) Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Salam, R. (2018) Melting Pot or Civil War?: A Son of Immigrants Makes the Case Against Open Borders. New 
York: Sentinel. 
 21 
Sangiovanni, A. (2007) ‘Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 35(1), 
pp. 3–39. 
Spolaore, E. and Wacziarg, R. (2013) ‘How Deep Are the Roots of Economic Development?’, 
Journal of Economic Literature, 51(2), pp. 325–369. 
United Nations Development Programme (2019) 2019 Human Development Index Ranking. Available 
at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/2019-human-development-index-ranking (Accessed: 16 August 
2020). 
van der Vossen, B. (2015) ‘Immigration and self-determination’, Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 14(3), 
pp. 270–290. 
van der Vossen, B. and Brennan, J. (2018) In Defense of Openness. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Wellman, C. H. (2008) ‘Immigration and Freedom of Association’, Ethics, 119(1), pp. 109–141. 
Weltman, D. (2020) ‘Illiberal Immigrants and Liberalism’s Commitment to Its Own Demise’, Public 
Affairs Quarterly, 34(3), pp. 271–297. 
Williamson, C. (2009) ‘Informal institutions rule: institutional arrangements and economic 
performance’, Public Choice, 139, pp. 371–387. 
 
